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Abstract 
 The broad objective of this research was to determine the effect of 
board structure on the performance of financial institutions in Kenya and 
also to find out what the intervening and mediating influence of the tenure of 
the CEO and firm’s characteristics on this relationship might be. The specific 
objectives included; to examine the influence of board structure on 
performance of financial institutions in Kenya; to determine the intervening 
influence of CEO tenure on the association among board structure and 
performance of financial sector firms in Kenya; to examine the moderating 
effect of the firms’ characteristics on the association among board structure 
and performance of financial institutions in Kenya; and to ascertain the joint 
effect of board structure, CEO tenure and firms’ characteristics on 
performance. Secondary data was collected for a ten-year period from 2006 
to 2015. Moderated and stepwise regression models and correlation analysis 
were adopted for the investigation of the association among the variables. 
The results showed that board structure had independent significant 
influence on performance of financial institutions; there was no 
significant intervening effect of CEO tenure on this relationship; there 
was a significant moderating effect of firms’ characteristics on the 
relationship; and the joint effect of board structure, CEO tenure and firms’ 
characteristics was significant. Through this study, the formulation of 
managerial policies and practices which will promote better governance 
practices and also appropriate the characteristics of firms and that will 
improve performance of financial institutions will be enhanced. 
 
Keywords: Board Structure, CEO Tenure, Firms’ Characteristics, 
Performance 
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Introduction 
 Upsurge of boardroom tussles and corporate collapses have been 
witnessed in both developed economies like Commerce Bank (1991), Enron 
(2001), Adelphia (2002), HIH and World Com (2002) as well as in 
developing economies alike, such as Uchumi Supermarkets, East African 
Portland, CMC and Mumias Sugar Limited which are all in Kenya. Financial 
institutions in developing economies have also not been spared by the wave 
of corporate collapses and such collapses in the last three years have 
included Imperial Bank, Chase Bank, Dubai Bank, and National Bank of 
Kenya. In all of these, the members of the respective boards have been 
widely held responsible for the reduction in shareholders’ wealth and most of 
these firms’ failures. Most of fraud related cases that have led to the failure 
of major corporates have been attributed to the members of the board and 
management raising the question on the ability of members of the board to 
monitor managements of those firms. The various reforms and standards 
developed both in Kenya, and at the global level (such as the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act in the United States) enhanced listing requirements including the 
Corporate Governance Code in Kenya, provide evidence of the need for 
strong governance structures. Most researches on corporate governance have 
been undertaken within developed economies; hence limited research exists 
in developing economies. 
 Financial institutions in Kenya are important for economic growth 
and development. They play a number of roles that would ensure micro and 
macro-economic growth and development. Generally, the assumption has 
been that the board dynamics of non-financial firms equally work for 
financial institutions. There is growing recognition that financial institutions 
board dynamics is different due to the broader responsibilities on directors 
and the regulatory regimes. Therefore, governance cannot be generalized 
across all companies. Furthermore, extant literature has provided evidence 
that corporate governance in itself is not static, but rather dynamic and 
emergent. It is on this basis that their performance continues to be a key 
concern to the management practitioners and researchers. The choice of the 
optimal board structure would be a panacea to the improvement of strategic 
choices yielding to better performance (Kajola, 2004). In the years 2012 and 
2013 alone, Kenyan Banks, being the most critical player in the financial 
sector, unveiled new chief executives and thereby raised several questions 
regarding the rate of CEO turnover. This further caused researchers as well 
as practitioners to raise questions relating to the effect of CEO tenure on 
performance and whether the CEO turnover would sustain growth in the 
years ahead. 
 Empirical evidence has yielded mixed and contradictory results on 
the optimal board structure (Dalton et al., 1998). However, most agree on the 
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important variables representing board structure and that may have an impact 
on the monitoring and thus performance. The debate about influence of 
board structure on the profitability of a firm continues, given that prior 
research has yielded conflicting results (Dalton et al., 1998) suggesting that 
other factors mediate or intervene to the acceleration of the relationship. 
Firms’ characteristics and CEO tenure could be some of the factors that 
come into play. A number of studies have established negative relationship 
among the CEO turnover, CEO tenure, and firms’ performance (Murphy & 
Zimmerman, 1993; Weisbach, 1988). Furthermore, studies have shown that 
firms undergoing transition in emerging economies have higher degrees of 
ownership concentration which are associated with the firms’ corporate 
governance, financing, and investment policies. Ownership of most firms is 
distributed among institutional investors and retail investors; with ownership 
concentrated mainly to institutional investors (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The 
ownership can also be categorized into state ownership and public 
ownership. The type of ownership structure of a firm ultimately affects the 
board structure categorized in this study as type 1 board, whose members 
directly own equity shares in the firm; type 2 board, where the board 
members do not hold any equity shares in the firm whose board they sit on; 
and type 3, which is a blend between the two extremes, where some 
members own equity shares and some do not hold any equity shares. 
 Studies have concentrated on understanding how board structure as a 
variable of corporate governance affects performance of firms. Whenever 
there is an agency conflict among the various relationships in the firm, 
corporate governance has the ability of influencing a firm’s performance. In 
the management-shareholder conflict, the agency problem is often 
manifested in management’s self-interest. In the controlling-minority 
shareholder conflict, on the other hand, shareholders with controlling power 
tend to employ these powers to expropriate. The main cause of these two sets 
of conflicts is as a result of the managers in the first case and the controlling 
shareholders in the second case receiving only a portion of the firm’s 
earnings, while they fully appropriate the resources diverted.  
 In view of the above, it can be concluded that empirical studies which 
have been conceptualized along the influence of either the CEO tenure and 
or firms’ characteristics regarding the effect of board structure on 
performance in developing countries are rare. Prior research in the field of 
corporate governance has majorly focused on its best practices among 
developed countries (e.g., Dahya & McConnell, 2007; Wintoki et al., 2012). 
It is notable that a number of institutional factors regarding newly-
industrialising countries are quite different and therefore this study shifts to a 
new setting where it examines the impact of board structure, CEO tenure, 
and firms’ characteristics on firms’ performance. 
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 Empirical studies on board structure and performance have 
demonstrated that the relationship is quite equivocal and does not reveal any 
conclusive relationship (Dalton & Daily, 1999). Board structure variables 
studies include size, diversity, CEO duality, busyness, and composition 
among others. However, no evidence has been found that board type as 
defined in this study has been used as a variable. The question remains as to 
the casual relationship between these variables. There is need to depart from 
traditional board structure variables and attempt construction of a new and 
comprehensive theoretical model, which would cover all the emerging issues 
in the board structure and close the gap. 
 
Research Objectives 
 The general objective of this research was to determine whether a 
relationship existed among board structure, CEO tenure, firms’ 
characteristics, and the performance of financial institutions in Kenya.  
 The specific objectives were:  
 i) To determine the effect of board structure on performance of 
financial institutions in Kenya. 
 ii) To establish the intervening effect of CEO tenure on the 
relationship between board structure and performance of financial 
institutions in Kenya. 
 iii) To find out the moderating effect of firms’ characteristics on 
the relationship between board structure and performance of financial 
institutions in Kenya. 
 iv) To ascertain the joint effect of board structure, CEO tenure, 
and firms’ characteristics on performance of financial institutions in Kenya. 
 
Literature Review 
Theoretical Review  
 Scholars and governance practitioners agree that there is a more 
"varied and complex" association among the board structure and 
performance than can be dealt with in each individual governance theory 
(Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). Neither the general model nor the links between 
the two variables can be fully explained by a single theory. The 
conceptualization in this study is supported by the agency, the upper echelon, 
the convergence of interests, the entrenchment, and stewardship theories. 
 
Agency Theory 
 In general, the starting point for any corporate governance debate is 
the principal agent theory (Anthony & Biekpe, 2002). "Modern society and 
private property" by Berle and Means (1932), described in their classical 
research, is the theoretical basis of most research studies in governance. The 
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agency's theory describes the most relevant agency issues in today’s 
institutions, particularly since separation of ownership and control exist. 
Modern companies suffer from control and ownership separation, as they are 
managed by professionals who are not owners. Empirical evidence to explain 
both the nature of these agency problems and how to settle them has been 
documented by Jensen and Meckling's (1976) fundamental work through 
proposing the theory of the firm which is based on conflicts of interest 
among the stakeholders involved, equity holders, executives and debt 
holders. Empirically and theoretically, the finance theory has been developed 
to enable a thorough examination of the issues caused by the divergence of 
interests among business managers and equity owners. 
 This view is consistent with the principle-agent paradigm. To this 
end, ensuring management considers shareholder interests of reducing costs 
related with the agent's conflict is a key issue. Consequently, managers are 
faced with a number of issues: first, is how to select the appropriate 
professionals (managers). Second, is a moral hazard problem, which allows 
managers the proper incentives of making efforts and decisions that are 
aligned with equity holders' interests (Antonio & Biekpe, 2002). The theory 
of the agency justifies the propensity of advice dominated by outsider-
dominated boards (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Given that 
contemporary firms have separated ownership and control, it creates moral 
hazard problems among management and the owners. There is a likelihood 
that the former may exploit the information they have for their own selfish 
reasons that may result in damage of the owners’ interests. In addition, the 
theory is in support of separating positions of the board chairperson and CEO 
or else agency costs become enhanced. Especially if the chairman controls 
the CEO, then the company experiences financial and market control (Balta, 
2008). In corporate governance, the main disadvantage of agency theory is 
that it only focuses on the equity holders’ goals, thus locking out other 
subjects in firm management and operation. This theory helps to determine 
the variables of the study, the organizational characteristics and structure of 
the board of the company due to the support of lean boards dominated from 
the outside and the theory of the property rights of the company. The theory 
is also relevant for studying the separation of control property and it also 
creates a conflict that can be managed through the structure of the board. 
 
Convergence-of-interests Theory 
 The agency's conflict can be resolved by promoting the ownership of 
equity among the directors in an attempt to align their interests with those of 
equity holders. The theory of convergence of interests assumes that in cases 
where the board does not participate in share ownership, they become self-
sufficient, but possess petite power to maneuver controls that have been put 
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in place. Hence, guarantees equity holders’ interests are considered. 
Mechanism of the corporate governance in this case includes the existence of 
independent members of the board who have shown to cause less 
manipulation of fraud and earnings (Beasley et al., 2000; Klein, 2002). 
Increased share ownership by directors compels them to keep the equity 
holders’ interests in mind when making decisions (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Beasley, 1996). 
 As share ownership increases, managers are more likely to take steps 
that will lead to the aligning of their interests with those of equity holders. 
Increasing the decision-making quality improves harmonization of actual 
cash flows with profits, i.e. increasing the quality of earnings. Executives 
become more aware, engage in less fraud, and get less motivated to 
deliberately manipulate profits to improve performance from what it is. In 
short, when employees have share ownership, they behave like unique 
owners; every action they undertake against the interest of company ends up 
hurting them. At this point, governance mechanism wouldn’t be needed 
(Teresa & Giuseppe, 2011). This theory helps the researcher to develop the 
board type as a fundamental feature of the board's structure variable and 
using postulations of the theory proceeds to categorize it into three types.  
 
Entrenchment Theory  
 Morck et al. (1988), contrary to the theory of convergence of 
interests, developed entrenchment theory that alludes to a negative 
relationship among profitability and board share ownership. “Entrenchment 
theory” says that higher levels of ownership reduce business performance. 
This agrees with the logic that maximizing market share and technology 
leadership rather than maximizing profits is attributed to managers who own 
significant levels of shares. The involvement of the board members also has 
a negative influence on the value of the company (Dwivedi & Jain, 2005). 
 The entrenchment theory has similar conclusions on employees at 
extremely low as well as extremely high levels of capital. At low levels of 
share ownership, employees do not consider equity holders’ interests; 
however, they are so scarce that they lack the power to subvert the 
governance arrangements. With high levels of shares ownership, executives 
or directors are shareholders; as such, inadequate actions maybe be 
damaging themselves. It is, in essence, the average range of the equity 
holding that tends to differ. When managers or principal altogether get a 
relatively high share of equity (but not the extreme levels of ownership that 
aligns their interests with shareholders), can they have enough to maneuver 
controls (Fama & Jensen, 1983)? This theory helps the researcher to develop 
the board type as a fundamental feature of the board's structure variable. 
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 Entrenchment theory allows executives to act on their own interests 
without major fears of elimination or sanctions; since they could "shut up". 
Previously, other studies have shown that this phenomenon may occur at 
relatively low levels of absolute ownership (Morck et al., 1988). If the 
degree of integration exists, it should reflect on poor quality of income. The 
poor quality of profits shows that managers may intentionally manipulate 
profits, exclude and commit bad decisions, or carry out fraudulent activities 
that reduce profits. All of these activities imply that actual cash flows vary 
from the benefit projects should provide as cash flows. In cases where the 
theory aligned, a strategy for the institutions could have included providing 
equity ownership to the employees and members of the board, which would 
enhance control measures within the depth range. Therefore, it is important 
to know where there might be thresholds inside as well as outside the range 
and whether the governance mechanisms can overcome the integration 
process. 
 
Stewardship Theory  
 In Stewardship theory, it is argued that agents are motivated by both 
individual goals and the principal’s interest (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson & 
Davis, 1991). This theory therefore shows that independent external board 
members are not necessarily motivated by their own goals and thus excludes 
them from being agents, but makes them the best managers of their 
companies (Davis et al., 1997). This theory, however, supports the principle 
of CEO's duality. Only when there is CEO duality can the power of 
executives and the best management duty be exercised (Donaldson & Davis, 
1991). It also explains the importance of internal directors. The proponents 
of the theory believe that CEO-chairperson duality leads to strengthened 
leadership coupled up with internal effectiveness. The firm will have one 
voice speaking on its behalf and disagreements between the CEO and the 
board’s chairperson are avoided (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997). 
Stewardship theorists agreed with this conclusion calling it CEO duality and 
stating that it improved organizational leadership efficacy. This is, however, 
in contrast to agency theorists, who are in support of separating the CEO and 
Chairman roles in order to promote proper checks on management. Various 
studies have concluded that the association among CEO-chairperson duality 
and performance of a firm is disputed and ambiguous.  
 Stewardship theory states that the board’s key function is to basically 
advise and put managerial steps in place in order to discipline and monitor, a 
vision that is considered diametrically opposed to agency theory. This theory 
states that the association among board of directors’ composition and the 
company's profitability is possibly due to advice provided by external 
directors instead of its monitoring and control activities (Anderson & Reeb, 
European Scientific Journal November 2017 edition Vol.13, No.31 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
46 
2004). The theory is important to this study as it shows the value of board 
structure and ensures that managerial behavior is aligned with principle’s 
interests and therefore enhances performance. Through the theory, CEO 
duality is identified as one of the variables of board structure in order to 
empirically test its impact on performance. The theory also further guides the 
conceptualization of CEO tenure as having a likely significant intervening 
effect on the association among board structure and institutional 
performance. 
 
The Upper Echelons Theory   
 CEO tenure, which is the moderating variable of this study, is 
anchored on this theory. The theory was developed by Hambrick and Mason 
(1984). The theory posits that organizational performance and strategic 
choices are partially provided by top management demographics. It suggests 
that managerial decisions do not always follow rational reasons, but are 
largely influenced by the natural limits of executives as human beings 
(Nielsen, 2010). 
 The theory suggests that senior management demography includes 
age, education, functional background, and financial positions. Other 
researchers also included tenure (Nielson & Nielsen, 2013) and gender 
(Marimuthu & Kolandaisamy, 2009) as part of the demographic elements of 
senior management. Therefore, the study is based on the fact that the 
managing director is part of the upper echelon; his mandate will influence his 
strategic choices and, consequently, the performance of the institution. The 
theory developed the proposition that the long-term CEO seemed to propose 
towards the status quo and would be reluctant to implement change strategies 
(Nielsen, 2010). An organization that has a managing director with different 
holding benefits from the different experiences and perspectives brought by 
the single CEO and this has a positive influence on performance. 
 Supporters of the upper echelon theory said companies with younger 
managers were more prone to risk strategies than older managers and that 
organizations with younger managers might experience growth and 
profitability. This position was supported by other researchers who argued 
that younger managers tend to be related to organizational performance since 
they were ready to change. The theory also developed the proposition that 
the long-time managing director seemed to be pushing for the status quo and 
would be reluctant to implement change strategies (Nielsen, 2010). An 
organization that has a managing director with different holding, benefits 
from the different experiences and perspectives brought by the single CEO 
and this has a positive impact on performance. 
 The theory proposals have given rise to significant literature in the 
investigation of the role of CEOs, their holding, and their performance in the 
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company. The theory has implications for the study as it helps to formulate 
the research hypothesis that the CEO's tenure and mandate plays a major role 
in the association among board structure and institutions’ profitability. 
Apparently, the theory still requires empirical data, especially in different 
contexts. The importance of top management, as posed by theory, implies 
that the CEO's combination of mandates with other variables in this study is 
needed to prove the basis of this theory. This theory has guided the 
conceptualization of the influence of CEO tenure on the conduct of financial 
institutions in Kenya. 
 
Empirical Review  
 Ongore (2011) indicates that the board of directors only cannot be a 
solution to all governance problems. His findings show that research on ideal 
corporate governance structures should pay inordinate attention to the 
board’s omission of some other likewise essential aspects of governance like 
ownership structure. The risk-taking orientations of their equity holders 
directly influence the decisions of management regarding investment 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). Organizational characteristics including 
structures of ownership manifest themselves in governance of organizations 
differently. 
 The empirical literature on the variables of the study, board structure, 
CEO tenure, firms’ characteristics and firms’ performance as conceptualized 
in this study are rare. Studies that have looked at the variables’ direct 
relationships have reported inconclusive results, for instance the works of 
Yermack (1996); Klapper and Love (2002); Gompers et al. (2003); and 
Black et al. (2003). The scholars did not record any significant association 
among the “best practices” in corporate governance and profitability. 
Additionally, Coles et al. (2008) argued that board structure is not relevant in 
the study of CEO and organizational profitability.  
 Coles et al. (2008) studied the relationship among governance 
including structure of the board and profitability of the firm. There exists a 
positive association among concentration of ownership and performance. 
Further research on the CEO’s payment, term in the office, and profitability 
association  include the studies of Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Dalton et 
al. (1998). These scholars have concluded on board composition, financial 
skills of the board, and CEO duality, as the main components of corporate 
governance. Johl et al. (2015) noted that a good corporate governance 
framework incorporates ownership concentration, directors’ equity 
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Research Gaps 
 Research on members of the board has originally been centered on 
the association among the structure of the board and profitability of the firm. 
Previous studies have not shown a conclusive association among the 
structure of the board and profitability (Dalton & Daily, 1999). Therefore, 
further research should be done on other areas of the board. This conclusion 
is in agreement with conclusions by Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996). 
The process of the board could be the absent connection. Generally, the 
process of the board refers to the decisive action of the board (Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989). Anderson and Anthony (1988) concluded that the process of 
the board refers to the good and meticulous discussions of issues affecting 
the firm so as to make appropriate decisions and follow them through.  
 Variables of structure of the board, which were studied, included size 
of the board, CEO duality, board business, and composition of the board 
among others. However, no evidence has been found that board type has 
been widely used as a variable. A research gap exists as to how board 
members with a financial stake in the firm are likely to impact on financial 
performance. The question remains as to the casual relationship between 
these variables. There is need to depart from traditional board structure 
variables and attempt construction of a new, comprehensive theoretical 
model, which would cover all of the emerging issues in the board structure 
and close the gap. 
 Further research should introduce a consolidative concept model 
among structure of the board and its performance, with process of the board 
as an intervening variable. Only recently has literature on the process of the 
board have become available. Given that it is not easy to access boards of 
organizations, this could be the factor contributing to insufficient research on 
the process of the board (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Contrary to this, the 
researcher believes that such a limitation should not excuse lack of 
development of a working model for conceptual analysis.
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Table 2.1. Summary of Research Gaps  
Author(s) Focus of the Study Findings Research Gaps Bridging the gaps in the proposed study 
Daily and Dalton (1993) To examine the influence of CEO 
duality on financial performance of 
institutions. 
No relationship with financial 
performance. 
The study used ROA, ROE, P/E ratio as 
the performance indicators. 
Sales growth has been introduced as a 
performance indicator. 
Vance (1995) To examine the influence of Insiders vs 
Outsiders on performance of firms. 
Executive directors' representation had a 
positive relationship with financial 
performance. 
The study only focused on two board 
structure variables.  
The study focuses on a number of board 
structure variables.  
Anthony et al. (2002) To examine the influence of the size of 
the board, independence and CEO 
duality on profitability operationalized 
by ROA, Tobin’s q, and Growth in 
revenue of non-financial listed firms on 
the GSE. 
The governance structures studied the 
impacts of the profitability of Ghanaian 
Organizations. 
The commercial banks and other 
financial institutions were not included 
in the research consistent with other 
studies because of their huge debt 
structures. 
The study focused on the financial 
institutions. 
Bonazzi and Islam (2007) To design a model to find a solution for 
an on-going problem in financial 
economics: how can CEOs be 
efficiently supervised by the members 
of the board? 
The design of the model focused on 
identifying an optimal level of control 
and monitoring, which maximizes 
equity share value, to guide the board of 
directors. 
The model was limited as it does not 
speak of the input of other board 
members and it is focused mainly on the 
monitoring function, despite the fact that 
the boards also play vital 
responsibilities. 
The effects of individual governance 
variables were studied. 
Benjamin Ehikioya 
(2007) 
To determine the relationship among 
corporate governance structure and 
performance of institutions in Nigeria. 
Ownership concentration positively 
affects performance. Although the 
findings do not provide evidence to 
support the influence of board 
independence on performance, there is 
significant evidence to prove the fact 
that CEO duality unfavorably influences 
firm performance.  
The research relied a lot on publicly 
accessible data for a sample of more 
than 100 Nigerian listed organizations 
from 1998 to 2002 and focused on 
corporate governance variables. 
The study included non-listed firms to get 
more insights into the variables. The study 
introduces board type as a new variable for 
board structure and measures CEO tenure. 
Jackling and Johl (2009) To examine the association among 
internal governance structures and 
performance companies in India.  
The research findings are in agreement 
with facets of agency theory as a higher 
ratio of non-executive directors 
increased profitability. 
Thesis adopted an exploratory design. The study adopts a multiple regression 
analysis. 
Tatyana Sokolyk (2010) To investigate the influence of 
governance provisions on forced CEO 
exit due to inappropriate acquisitions. 
CG provisions have no effect on 
probability of forced CEO exit 
following inappropriate acquisitions. 
The effect of the CEO tenure is not 
considered. 
CEO tenure was studied alongside the 
turnover.  
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Afzalur Rashid (2011) This research set out to examine board 
independence and the effect of  
Independence of board structure on 
profitability of organizations in 
Bangladesh. 
The finding of the research is in support 
of the agency theory, but negates the 
stewardship theory suggesting that the 
non-executive directors and combined 
leadership role do not increase 
profitability. 
The data was obtained from the 
observation of different corporations 
while ignoring underlying 
organizational differences. 
 
The study focused on a specific industry of 
the financial services sector. 
Michael Adusei (2011) To determine the association among 
board structure and profitability of 
Ghanaian banks. 
The results indicate that reduced board 
size enhances performance, and 
composition of the board has an 
insignificant negative correlation with 
profitability. 
The study focuses only on two board 
variables. 





Teresa and Joseph (2011) To determine the association among 
board share ownership and CG on 
profitability of corporations. 
Conclusion is in agreement with 
entrenchment theory. Both independent 
and insider boards become entrenched, 
negatively profitability and CG structure  
It’s not clear how profitability is 
affected by individual governance 
variables. .  
The effect of individual governance variables 
was studied. 
Letting et al. (2012) Diversity of the board and profitability 
of firms in  NSE. 
The findings provide evidence of a weak 
positive association among profitability 
and diversity of the board. 
The study was limited to firms listed at 
the NSE and only to members of the 
Board. 
The study included CEO tenure and is 
contextualized in FIs including non-listed 
firms. 
Kamaara et al. (2013) The relationship between BoD 
characteristics and performance of 
commercial SCs in Kenya. 
There is a strong association among 
board composition/ characteristics and 
performance of commercial SCs in 
Kenya. 
The study was limited to only 
commercial SCs in Kenya and studied 
BoD characteristics only. 
The study included CEO tenure and is 
contextualized in FIs including Commercial 
and nonprofit making. 
Akbah Ahsan (2015) The role of CG mechanisms in firm 
profitability optimization in Pakistan.  
CG significantly increases profitability. The study was limited to developing a 
conceptual model. 
The study undertook an empirical analysis. 
Bhatt R. R. and 
Bhattacharya S. (2015) 
Board structure and profitability of 
Indian IT organizations. 
The study, after controlling for firm-
specific factors, shows that larger sizes 
of the board positively influenced firms’ 
performance. The research failed to find 
any association among the number of 
board meetings and firms’ performance. 
However, attendance at other events by 
the board of directors was found to be 
positively related to firms’ performance. 
The study ignored intervening and 
moderating effects of any other 
variables. 
The study included CEO tenure and firms’ 
characteristics as intervening and moderating 
variables. 
Johl S.K, Kaur S., and 
Cooper B.J. (2015)  
Determine the effect of board 
characteristics on profitability. The 
study focuses on effects of board 
meeting, board composition, size of the 
board and directors accounting 
expertise on firm accounting 
Concluded that board independence has 
no effect on profitability. Whereas size 
of the board and its financial expertise 
positively affect profitability. Board 
diligence, that is meetings, positively 
affects profitability. 
The study ignored intervening and 
moderating effects of any other 
variables. 
The study included CEO tenure and firms’ 
characteristics as intervening and moderating 
variables. 
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performance. 
Wah K. K., Shafie M. Z., 
and  Kamilah A. (2015) 
Determine the influence of corporate 
governance practices on firms’ 
Performance. 
The result showed that board size has 
significantly weak negative relationship 
with ROA, but it was found to be 
insignificant to ROE. The other finding 
indicated that there was no significant 
association among board independence 
and performance of institutions. 
The study ignored intervening and 
moderating effects of any other 
variables 
The study included CEO tenure and firms’ 
characteristics as intervening and moderating 
variables. 
Zona Fabio (2016).  Agency models in various stages of the 
CEO’s term: The influence of 
managerial share options and 
composition of the board on R&D 
investment. 
Combining the two agency models of 
limited competence and managerial 
opportunism, the conclusion is that 
governance variables affect CEO’s term 
differently in the early and later stages. 
Earlier, R&D investment is reduced by 
stock options and board independence; 
whereas in later stages, these effects 
reversed. 
The study is limited to US firms where 
corporate governance is well developed. 
The study used data from a developing 
country, Kenya, to determine how 




To examine Board Characteristics, 
Audit Committee, and Ownership 
Structure effect on Performance of 
institutions. 
Board size has a significant positive 
effect on profitability, ROA and ROE. 
Audit committee independence is 
significant and negatively affected by 
ROE. The same promoters' shareholding 
is negatively and significantly 
associated with all the financial 
measures and there is a significant 
negative association among institutional 
shareholding and financial performance 
(Tobin’s Q and ROA). 
The study ignored intervening and 
moderating effects of any other 
variables. 
The study included CEO tenure and firms’ 
characteristics as intervening and moderating 
variables. 
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Conceptual Framework 
 The conceptual model has integrated the theories of agency, 
entrenchment, and convergence of interests to present a conceptualised 
interaction among board structure (independent variables) and institutional 
performance (dependent variables). A discussion of the dependent, 
independent, moderating, and intervening variables is undertaken followed 
by the conceptual model and the research hypotheses. The model further 
conceptualizes CEO tenure as intervening, while firms’ characteristics were 
placed as moderating in the relationship. This position is depicted in 
hypothesis two and three in the diagram. Finally, the model tests the joint 
effect of the three variables on performance in hypothesis four. This 
proposition has not been previously tested to the best knowledge of the 
researcher. The model postulates that since the ownership is separated from 
control, the agent could be motivated by selfish reasons. The structure of the 
board and its effectiveness provides an essential controlling function in an 
effort to address the agency conflict that exists among the management and 
equity holders. Figure 2.1 shows the conceptual framework for this study.  
Figure 2.1. Conceptual Model   
 
 
Hypothesis of the Study 
 From the above conceptual model, the following four hypotheses 
were formulated and tested:  
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Ho1: There is no significant effect of board structure on performance of 
financial institutions in Kenya. 
Ho2: There is no significant intervention effect of CEO tenure in the 
relationship between board structure and performance of financial 
institutions in Kenya. 
Ho3: There is no significant moderation effect of firms’ characteristics in the 
relationship between board structure and performance of financial 
institutions in Kenya. 
Ho4: There is no significant joint effect of board structure, CEO tenure and 
firms’ characteristics on performance of financial institutions in Kenya. 
 
Methodology 
Research Design, Data, and Sampling  
 Using data from a developing country, Kenya, a correlational 
research design was developed. The data required was collected for a ten-
year period from 2006 to 2015 for the institutions that were sampled from 
the financial sector in Kenya through data collection sheets from annual 
reports and company websites. The population of the research was 3,989 
financial institutions in Kenya comprising 5 regulators, 43 commercial 
banks, 10 Investment banks, 2 development banks, and 1 mortgage finance 
company, 41 insurance companies, 9 deposit taking micro-finance 
institutions, and 3,887 Sacco’s (http://www.centralbank.go.ke). The study 
followed the simple stratified random sampling in obtaining viable data sets 
and sampled 98 firms from all the categories.  
 
Operationalization of Study Variables  
 The study used ROA to measure performance. Consistent with 
Rashid and Lodh (2008), the research computed ROA using EBIT scaled by 
the book value of total assets. It used multi variables to represent the board 
structure. This comprised of the size, composition, activity, diversity, CEO 
Duality, and type. Board size was adopted because it has several 
consequences of how the board functions and hence the performance of the 
organizations (Coles et al., 2008). Board independence also referred to as 
composition (BDCOM) in this research referred to the ratio of outsiders or 
independent members of the board, who are not involved in the operations 
of the institutions consistent with the studies by Gurasamy (2017). The 
CEO duality is when the chairperson occupies the CEO position too. In line 
with several studies, Daily and Dalton (1994), the CEO duality was a 
binary. However, it is described as a variable of the duality of the CEO, 
which was equal to zero if the CEO position was held by the same person as 
the chairman, otherwise one.  
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Table 3.2. Operationalization of Variables 
Variable Type of 
Variable 
Indicator Operationalization Literature 
Board Structure Independent Board Size (BS) The natural logarithm of the 
total board members-NBM 
Coles et al., 2008; 





Ratio of non-executive board 
members to the total 
members of the board- 
NIDOB 
Kamaara, Gachunga   
and Waititu (2013) 
CEO Duality 
(CEOD) 
Dummy: Value zero (0) 
where CEO duality exists & 
one (1) for otherwise. -
CEOCP 




Number of meetings and 
other activities-NBMeet 




Proportion of female 
members of the board to the 
total board members -
NfmDOB 




Type 1, 2 and 3 as defined in 
the study-NDOES-PDTEH 




Dependent Return on 
Assets (ROA) 





Current Revenue - previous 
year’s revenue/ previous 
year’s revenue  
CEO Tenure 
(CEOT) 
Intervening Years Number of years since 






Moderating Firms’ Size 1 The natural logarithm of total 
assets 
Barako et al., 2006 
Listed firms 
(LIS) 
Dummy: 1: if institution is 
listed on NSE; = 0: Otherwise 





Dummy: 1: if firm is state 





Data Analysis  
 Descriptive statistics including measures of central tendency were 
calculated. Moderated and stepwise regression models and correlation 
analysis were adopted to investigate the association among board structure 
and performance. Some variables were denoted in logarithm form since 
they were measured in millions, while others were denoted as rates where 
the values were also high and the rest as absolute numbers. The usage of 
logarithm was to enhance standardization of values in the model. 
 The model tested hypothesis one as follows; 
ROAi,t =  α+β1BSi,t+β2BCi,t +β3CEODi,t + β4BAi,t +β5BDi,t +β6BTi,t  +  
εi,t..........................1.1 
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ROAi,t  =  α+β1BSi,t++β2BCi,t +β3CEODi,t + β4BAi,t +β5BDi,t+ β6BTi,t 
+β7CEOTi,tt+  εi,t....1.2 
Where, ROA is Return on assets. 
 Board Structure is represented by; BS which is Board Size; BC is 
Board Composition; CEOD is Chief Executive Officer Duality; BA is Board 
Activity; BD is Board Diversity; and BT is Board Type. CEOT is Chief 
Executive Officer Tenure; α denotes the intercept, β denotes the regression 
coefficient, and ε denotes the error term. 
The model tests hypothesis two as follows; 
ROAi,t =α+β1BSi,t++β2BCi,t +β3CEODi,t + β4BAi,t +β5BDi,t+ β6BTi,t 
+β7CEOTi,tt+ εi,t.......1.3 
RGRi,t =α+β1BSi,t++β2BCi,t +β3CEODi,t + β4BAi,t +β5BDi,t +β6BTi,t+ 
β7CEOTi,t+εi,t........1.4 
 Where, CEOT is Chief Executive Officer Tenure, while the rest are 
as defined in Hypothesis one above. 
The model tested hypothesis three as follows; 
ROAi,t=α+β1BSi,t++β2BCi,t +β3CEODi,t + β4BAi,t +β5BD,t +β6BTi,t + 
β7SIZE1i,tt+ β8LISi,t+ 
β9OWNi,t+εi,t...........................................................................................1.5 
RGRi,=α+β1BSi,t++β2BCi,t +β3CEODi,t + β4BAi,t +β5BDi,t+ β6BTi,t+ 
β7SIZE1i,tt+ β9LISi,t+ β10OWNi,t+ 
εi,t............................................................................................................1.6 
 Where, Firms’ Characteristics is represented by SIZE, LIS and OWN 
being Firms’ Size, Stock exchange listing and Ownership Structure 
respectively. The other variables are as defined in hypothesis one above. 
 The model tested hypothesis four as follows; 
ROAi,t=α+β1BSi,t++β2BCi,t +β3CEODi,t + β4BAi,t +β5BDi,t+ 
β6BTi,t+β7CEOTi,tt + β8SIZE1i,tt+β9LISi,t+ 
β10OWNi,t+εi,t................................................................................1.7 
RGRi,=α+β1BSi,t++β2BCi,t +β3CEODi,t + β4BAi,t +β5BDi,t+ 





 Correlation analysis using Pearson product moment correlation 
coefficient technique and partial correlation analysis was used to examine 
whether there exists an association among board structure, CEO tenure, 
firms’ characteristics, and performance of organizations. Table 4.1 provides 
the findings of correlation analysis. The results demonstrate that there exists 
a statistical significant relationship among several board structure variables, 
CEO tenure, characteristics of the company, and performance of financial 
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institutions in Kenya. These results provide additional confirmation of the 
hypothesis as formulated and are a necessary precondition for further 
statistical tests including regression and GEE performed on the study 
hypothesis. 
Table 4.1. Correlation Analysis between Board Structure and Firms’ Performance 
 ROA gSales NBM NIDOB NBMeet NFmDB BoType CEOT 
ROA 
Pearson Correlation 1 .136 .033 .238 -.298** -.033 .407** .153 
Sig. (2-T)  .231 .773 .096 .008 .773 .000 .177 
N 79 79 79 50 79 79 79 79 
gSales 
Pearson Correlation .136 1 .143 .191 -.038 .175 .033 .163 
Sig. (2-T) .231  .208 .184 .738 .124 .776 .150 
N 79 79 79 50 79 79 79 79 
NBM 
Pearson Correlation .033 .143 1 .812** .436** .497** -.282* -.033 
Sig. (2-T) .773 .208  .000 .000 .000 .012 .775 
N 79 79 79 50 79 79 79 79 
NIDOB 
Pearson Correlation .238 .191 .812** 1 .180 .429** .451** .074 
Sig. (2-T) .096 .184 .000  .211 .002 .001 .610 
N 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
NBMeet 
Pearson Correlation -.298** -.038 .436** .180 1 .280* -.809** -.406** 
Sig. (2-T) .008 .738 .000 .211  .013 .000 .000 
N 79 79 79 50 79 79 79 79 
NFmDB 
Pearson Correlation -.033 .175 .497** .429** .280* 1 -.178 .038 
Sig. (2-T) .773 .124 .000 .002 .013  .117 .741 
N 79 79 79 50 79 79 79 79 
BoType 
Pearson Correlation .407** .033 -.282* .451** -.809** -.178 1 .461** 
Sig. (2-T) .000 .776 .012 .001 .000 .117  .000 
N 79 79 79 50 79 79 79 79 
NYSCEOA 
Pearson Correlation .153 .163 -.033 .074 -.406** .038 .461** 1 
Sig. (2-T) .177 .150 .775 .610 .000 .741 .000  
N 79 79 79 50 79 79 79 79 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).                                                    
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 The strength of the association among board structure 
operationalized by the number of directors, number of independent board 
members, number of meetings held by board members, number of female 
directors and number of directors owning equity shares. Also, the firms’ 
performance was determined using Pearson product moment correlation. As 
shown in Table 4.5a and 4.5b above, there is a positive correlation among 
the structure of the board and performance variables which was statistically 
significant.  
 Similarly, partial correlation coefficients that indicate the linear 
association among structure of the board and profitability of financial 
institutions while controlling for the effects of CEO tenure were computed. 
All the variables are scale variables. The assumption is that two variables 
can have a perfect relationship, but if the association is not linear, a 
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correlation coefficient is not a suitable statistic for determining their 
association. The basic question was: is there an association among board 
structure and performance of financial institutions in Kenya? What will be 
the relation if we control for CEO tenure? The study used three variable 
types; indicators of firm performance, ROA and growth in sales; indicators 
of board structure, Number of Board members (NBM), Number of 
independent directors on the board (NIDOB), Number of board meetings 
and other activities (NBMeet), Number of female directors on the board 
(NFmDB); and Board Type (BoType). The partial correlations tables below 
show both the zero-order correlations (correlations without any control 
variables) of all three variables and the partial correlation of the first two 
variables controlling for the influence of the third variable (CEO Tenure - 
CEOT). 
Table 4.2. Partial Correlations 
Number of Meetings (NBM) as board structure indicator and firms’ performance of 
financial institutions while controlling for the effects of CEO tenure. 
Control Variables ROA NBM CEOT 
-none-a 
ROA 
Correlation 1.000 .033 .153 
Significance (2-tailed) . .773 .177 
Df 0 77 77 
NBM 
Correlation .033 1.000 -.033 
Significance (2-tailed) .773 . .775 
Df 77 0 77 
NYSCEOA 
Correlation .153 -.033 1.000 
Significance (2-tailed) .177 .775 . 
Df 77 77 0 
NYSCEOA 
ROA 
Correlation 1.000 .038  
Significance (2-tailed) . .739  
Df 0 76  
NBM 
Correlation .038 1.000  
Significance (2-tailed) .739 .  
Df 76 0  
a. Cells contain zero-order (Pearson) correlations. 
      
 The zero-order correlation between ROA and Number of Board 
members (NBM) as the board structure indicator, indeed, is both low 
(0.333) and statistically insignificant (p < 0.001). The partial correlation 
controlling for the effects of CEO tenure (CEOT), however, improved but is 
negligible (0.038) and statistically not significant (p = 0.739). The results 
therefore cannot lead to the conclusion that a relationship between ROA 
and Number of Board members (NBM) existed even after controlling for 
the effects of CEO tenure (CEOT). 
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Hypothesis Testing and Summary of Findings 
 This was done through regression analysis. The regression was done 
through a panel process. Also, a number of alternatives of panel data 
hierarchical regressions were run, fixed and random effects, ordinary least 
squares commonly called OLS, generalized least squares (GLS), and a 
dynamic panel. Hierarchical multiple linear regression (HMLR) model was 
employed in assessing the nature of the relationship between various 
variables as hypothesised in the study at 5% level of statistical significance. 
Reliability tests on the regression models were then computed to determine 
the strength of the relationship among the variables. These tests included 
multicollinearity tests, adjusted coefficient of determination (adjusted R), F-
tests, and t tests. The data used in running the regression was the averages 
for all the 10 years per company.   
 The objective of the research centered on the establishment of the 
joint influence of board structure, CEO tenure, and firms’ characteristics on 
performance of financial institutions in Kenya. Board structure was the 
independent variable. Furthermore, CEO tenure was conceptualized as an 
intervening variable, while firms’ characteristics was conceptualized as a 
moderating variable in the board structure and performance of financial 
institutions in Kenya relationship. In order to effectively address the main 
research objective, four specific research objectives were formulated. The 
first objective was to ascertain the impact of board structure on profitability 
of financial institutions in Kenya.  The second objective sought to examine 
the intervening effect of CEO tenure on the association among board 
structure and performance of financial institutions in Kenya. Similarly, the 
third objective was to establish the moderating impact of firms’ 
characteristics on the association among board structure and performance of 
financial institutions in Kenya. The fourth objective sought to establish the 
combined influence of board structure, CEO tenure, and firms’ 
characteristics on performance of financial institutions in Kenya. The board 
structure indicators used are the board size, board activity, board type, board 
diversity, board composition and CEO duality; while the performance 
variables used are ROA and growth in revenue; and the control variable is 
the CEO tenure and firms’ characteristics measured by listing, firm’s size, 
and ownership structures. 
 The study was anchored on agency theory, convergence-of-interests 
theory, entrenchment theory, upper echelons theory, and stewardship theory. 
Thus, it used positivistic philosophy in testing four quantitative hypotheses. 
The study hypothesized that structure of the board does not significantly 
affect profitability of financial institutions in Kenya; there is no significant 
intervening effect of CEO tenure in the association among board structure 
and performance; there is no significant moderating effect of institutional 
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characteristics in the association among structure and performance; and 
there is no significant joint effect of board structure, CEO tenure and firms’ 
characteristics on performance. Secondary data was collected from financial 
institutions in Kenya for a ten-year period from 2006 to 2015. The study 
used both a correlational descriptive research design and cross-sectional 
survey design. The data collected was subjected to correlation, generalized 
estimating equation (GEE) and regression analysis. The findings provided 
by these data analysis methods was to confirm bi-directional association 
among profitability and structure of the board of financial institutions in 
Kenya. This is in addition to confirming that CEO tenure and firms’ 
characteristics impacted this relationship. The findings from the study on the 
impact of structure of the board on profitability of financial institutions 
brought out mixed results. The tests of hypotheses were done at 95 percent 
confidence levels (p<0.050) on the independent and combined effects. The 
results established that, over all, board structure had independent statistically 
significant impact on profitability of financial institutions in Kenya. 
 Hypothesis one (H01) hypothesized that there is no significant effect 
of board structure on profitability of financial institutions in Kenya. Results 
of hierarchical multiple regression show a significant impact (p<0.05) of 
board structure on firms’ performance. Similarly, the GEE results indicate 
that there is a significant effect (p<0.05) of board structure on firms’ 
performance and identifies board activity and board type as the two most 
statistically significant board structure variables that affect firms’ 
performance. In general, it can therefore be concluded that there is a 
significant effect of board structure on profitability resulting in the rejection 
of null hypothesis one. The results further show that the optimal number of 
board of directors’ meetings, and other activities that optimize performance 
of financial institutions in Kenya, are the 11 to 15 meetings in a year. Board 
type was also found to have a significant influence on performance of 
financial institutions in Kenya with board type 1 whose entire membership 
own equity shares being shown to have the greatest impact on performance 
of financial institutions in Kenya. The findings indicate that the other board 
structure variables including size, diversity, CEO duality, and independence 
do not significantly impact profitability of financial institutions in Kenya. 
 Hypothesis two (Ho2) sought to establish the intervening effect of 
CEO tenure on the association among board structure and performance of 
financial institutions in Kenya. Hypothesis two is not rejected implying that 
there is no significant intervening effect of CEO tenure in the association 
among board structure and performance of financial institutions in Kenya. 
Hypothesis three (H03) tested the mediating effect of firms’ characteristics 
on the association among board structure and performance of financial 
institutions in Kenya. Results of this study indicate that board structure 
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significantly predict firm’s performance even when firms’ characteristics is 
controlled (p<0.05), implying that firms’ characteristics has a mediating 
association among board structure and performance of financial institutions 
in Kenya. The null hypothesis three is therefore rejected. 
 Hypothesis four (Ho4) assessed the joint effects of board structure, 
CEO tenure, and firms’ characteristics on performance of financial 
institutions in Kenya. The findings of this study show that the overall model 
is statistically significant (p<0.05), implying that board structure, CEO 
tenure, and firms’ characteristics jointly have a significant effect on 




 The results presented mixed findings regarding the association 
among board structure variables and performance of financial institutions in 
Kenya. The intervening and moderating effect of CEO tenure and firm 
characteristics have also been documented. While several studies document 
a positive influence of board structure variables on performance, others 
found the opposite. This could be linked to the variety of methodologies and 
definitions of variables used and the study contextual factors that were not 
included in the analysis by the models used.   
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